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A UNIFIED CORPS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES - THE TRANSITION FROM
A CONCEPT TO AN EVENTUAL
REALITY
MICHEL LEVANT·

I.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of a unified corps of federal administrative law
judges began to be generally recognized approximately ten years
ago. The concept was simple. Transfer approximately 1100 judges
from twenty-nine different federal agencies into a single entity. The
principal reasons advanced for such a change were to insure judicial
independence and to provide significant efficencies and cost savings.
Although there was a substantial body of literature available on
the subject,l no document actually provided the specific details of a
unified corps for the federal government. What kind of structure
would be involved? How would such an entity be managed? How
would the expertise of judges at various agencies be preserved?
What impact would a unified corps have on the authority of the
agencies? These were just some of the many questions that came to
mind. But there were few precise answers. One thing was apparent;
there was overwhelming support for the concept within the adminis
trative law judge community. It was seen as a significant reform of
• Administrative Law Judge, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Past
Chairman, National Conference of Administrative Law Judges; currently, Budget Of
ficer, Judicial Administration Division. Dircc:tor, National Judicial College; member,
Administrative Conference of the United States. B.A., Syracuse University, 1954; J.D.,
Syracuse University College of Law, 1956.
The views expressed in this article arc solely those of the author.
1. See UNITED STATES CIVIL SERvtCE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE
STUDY OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMtNlSTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (LA MACCHIA COMM'N
REPORT) (1974); FEDERAL ADMtNlSTRATIVE LAW JUDGES CONFERENCE, STATEMENT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERvtCE COMM'N (1973); Lub
bers, A Un!fted Corps of AtiministraJiYe Low Judges: A Proposal to Test the Ideo at the
Federal Lnel, 65 JUDICATURE 266 (1981); Segal, The AtiministraJille Low Judge: Thirty
Years of Progress and the Rood Ahead, 62 A.B.A.J. 1424 (1976); Davis, A New Declara
tion ofIndependencefor AtiministraJille Low Judges, 17 JUDGES' J. 16 (1978).
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the administrative hearing process that was clearly in the public
interest.
It became apparent that unless the general concept could be
translated into a working blueprint that provided specific answers to
the many questions, there would be little hope that the concept could
ever become a reality. As Chairman of the National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges, Judicial Administration Division,
American Bar Association (ABA), the author formed a small draft
ing committee whose assignment it was to prepare such a detailed
document. 2 It was the Committee's charter to design a unified corps
which would maximize the benefits to the administrative process
with minimum changes in the existing system. Of particular concern
was preserving the review role of the agencies in the process as well
as their individual areas of expertise. The Committee thus set out to
transfer the trial of cases from twenty-nine agencies to a single entity
with centralized management. After much effort and deliberation
and extensive consultations with interested groups and persons, a de
tailed plan for the creation of a unified corps of federal administra
tive law judges emerged.
Our unified corps proposal was then presented to the Executive
Committee of the National Conference of Administrative Law
Judges. After extensive debate it was overwhelmingly approved in
August, 1982 at the ABA annual meeting. Subsequently, in Febru
ary, 1983 at the ABA midyear meeting the concept of a unified corps
was unanimously approved in principle by the Council of the Judi
cial Administration Division. The Executive Committee of the Fed
eral Administrative Law Judges Conference as well as the
Association of Administrative Law Judges also support the unified
corps proposal by a significant majority.
In May, 1983, Senator Howell Hefiin, on his own initiative, in
troduced legislation to establish a unified corps of administrative law
judges in the federal government. 3 The bill, Senate bill 1275,4 with
some minor modifications, refiected the proposal which was drafted
by our committee. Senator Hetlin, who as Chief Justice of the State
of Alabama was responsible for creating a unified court system in
that state, had long been a supporter of the concept and was well
aware of its potential benefits. The introduction of Senate bill 1275,
2. The committee consisted of Judges Nahum Litt, Victor Palmer, Jair Kaplan and
the author. Judge I. David Benkin, although not a member of the committee, contributed
extensively to this project.
3. 129 CONGo REc. S6610-13 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
4. S.1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

1984)

THE CONCEPT OF A UNIFIED CORPS

707

though unexpected at that point in time, was a major step in moving
the concept of a unified corps toward eventual reality.
II.

THE BILL

Senate bill 1275, entitled the "Administrative Law Judge Corps
Act" would establish a unified corps of administrative law judges,
separate and apart from the other government agencies. s The princi
pal provisions of the bill are summarized:
A. All administrative law judges appointed pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act,6 would be transferred to the Corps as
of the effective date of the Act. 7
B. A chief administrative law judge would be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among
qualified administrative law judges recommended by a "Judicial
Nomination Commission" comprised of five members named by
representatives of the courts, the Administrative Conference of the
United States, the American Bar Association and the Federal Ad
ministrative Law Judges Conference. 8
C. The Corps would be comprised of not more than ten but
not less than four divisions. Initially the bill proposes the following
seven divisions refiecting areas of specialization:
(I) Division of Communications, Public Utility and Transpor
tation Regulation;
(2) Division of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation;
(3) Division of Labor;
(4) Division of Labor Relations;
(5) Division of Benefits Programs;
(6) Division of Securities, Commodities and Trade Regulation;
(7) Division of General Programs and Grants. 9
Each judge would be assigned to a division in accordance with
his or her particular expertise. 10
Each division would have a chief judge nominated by the Judi
cial Nomination Commission and appointed by the President with
5.
1983).
6.
7.
§ 562).
8.

Id. The bill has been reprinted in 129 CONGo

REC.

S66IO-13 (dailyed. May 12,

5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982).
S.1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c.

Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. §§ 563, 566).
Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 564(a), (b».
10. Ia. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(c».

9.
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the advice and consent of the Senate. I I
D. The policymaking body of the Corps would be the council
of the Corps and would consist of the chief judge of the Corps and
each division chief judge. The council would be vested with broad
authority to conduct the business of the COrpS.12
E. The bill would provide that new judges be appointed to the
Corps under the present merit selection system from a register of
qualified applicants maintained by the Office of Personnel
Management. 13
F. The jurisdiction of the Corps would extend to all cases now
being heard under the Administrative Procedure Act and any other
cases referred to it by agencies and courts that desired to have a deci
sion on a record developed at a hearing conducted by an administra
tive law judge. 14
G. The bill would provide procedures for the removal and dis
cipline of administrative law judges. In addition to preserving such
provisions under the APA, it would establish a "Complaints Resolu
tion Board," composed of three judges elected by members of the
Corps, to initially consider, and to recommend appropriate action to
be taken upon, complaints against the official conduct of judges. IS
H. The chief judge of the Corps would be directed to make a
study of the various types and levels of agency review to which deci
sions of administrative law judges are subject and to report to the
President and the Congress not later than two years from the effec
tive date of the bill. This provision is intended to explore ways, for
example through a certiorari procedure, by which administrative law
judge decisions may be accorded a greater degree of finality in order
to expedite the process. 16
III.

THE CASE FOR A UNIFIED CORPS

The enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in
1946 brought much needed reform to the administrative process. 17
Pursuant to the Act, administrative law judges lS are selected on the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
5 U.S.c.
18.

ld. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564).
ld. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 565).
ld. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 567).
ld. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 568).
ld. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569).
ld. § 3.
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at
§§ 551-559,701-706, 1305,3105,3344,6362,7562 (1982».
Administrative law judges were known as "hearing examiners" until 1971
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basis of merit under a unique system for judicial selection. Adminis
trative law judges are provided with a form of tenure in that they are
removable only for good cause after hearing.l9 Moreover, they may
not be required to perform duties inconsistent with their judicial
function. 20 Their pay levels are prescribed, independent of agency
recommendations or ratings by the Office of Personnel Management,
rather than by individual agencies. 21 Perhaps most important, the
APA requires judges to conduct proceedings in an impartial man
ner.22 The provisions of the APA brought needed safeguards to the
administrative process.
A number of significant changes have taken place, however,
over the past thirty-eight years that now call for further measures to
improve the system. For instance, in June, 1947 there were approxi
mately 200 administrative law judges in the federal government. 23
Today there are approximately 1134.24 The Social Security Admin
istration alone went from thirteen judges in 1947 to approximately
750 today.2s The one notable decline is in the number of judges as
signed to economic regulatory agencies, a decrease from 125 in 1947
to approximately 80 today.26
The nature of the proceedings have also changed over the years.
In 1947 over sixty percent of administrative proceedings involved
ratemaking, licensing, and other forms of rulemaking by the various
economic regulatory agencies. 27 More recently those agencies ac
counted for less than seven percent of hearings conducted by admin
istrative law judges. 28 · Today, the overwhelming majority of cases
involve enforcement actions or claims for social security benefits.29
Administrative proceedings have become generally more formal
when the Civil Service Commission approved a change in the title. 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787
(1982). The title of "Administrative Law Judge" was formally conferred by an Act of
Congress in 1978. Act of March 27,1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, §§ 2-3, 92 Stat. 183, 183-84.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 5362 (1982).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1982).
23. Lubbers, supra note I, at 268.
24. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, TOTAL NUMBER OF AUs ON BOARD
BY GRADE AND AGENCY AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 1983.
25. See id; Lubbers, supra note I, at 268.
26. See OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, TOTAL NUMBER OF AUs ON
BOARD BY GRADE AND AGENCY AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 1983; Lubbers, supra note I, at
268.
27. Lubbers, .I'¥ra note I, at 268.

28. Id.
29. Id.
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and very much like trials in courts of law, with judges often presid
ing in robes and applying Federal Rules of Evidence. The judicial
ization of administrative proceedings is the result of the nature of the
proceedings and the demand for due process. 30 In Butz v. Econo
mou ,31 the Supreme Court recognized that administrative law judges
performed a role "functionally comparable" to that of traditional
judges.32
In recent years it has become apparent that a division of inter
ests and a conOict of functions separates judges from agencies.
Agency staffs appear regularly in proceedings before judges as par
ties in interest; moreover, agency programs are affected by the
judges' decisions. There is also a basic conflict in functions between
agencies and their judges in that agencies operate in the legislative
and executive sphere while the role of the judges and the administra
tive hearing process is principally judicial in nature. 33
This changed environment has brought about a need for a new
approach to the administrative hearing process. Given the signifi
cant increase in the number of cases and in the number of adminis
trative law judges, improved management to facilitate the prompt
disposition of cases has become imperative. It is essential that flex
ibility in the overall utilization of judges be provided to accommo
date the fluctuating volume of varying types of cases. It is also
desirable in a period of budgetary limitations to explore ways in
which the cost of the system may be reduced. Moreover, in recent
years there have been some disturbing incidents involving encroach
ment upon judicial independence34 that prompt the consideration of
additional safeguards.
The unified corps proposal has been offered to address some
serious problems now confronting the administrative hearing pro
cess. An examination of the principal objectives of the bill and the
expected benefits follows.
A.

More Efficient Management ofthe Hearing Process

The most compelling reason for establishing a unified corps is
the enhanced management efficiency that would be realized. Under
the present system, twenty-nine agencies within the federal govern
30. See, e.g.• Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see a/so Friendly. Some Kind
of Hearing. 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
31. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
32. Id. at 513.
33. Id. at 513-14.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 48-56.
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ment have their own staffs of administrative law judges varying in
number from one at the Drug Enforcement Administration to ap
proximately 750 at the Social Security Admioistration. 3s Actually,
five agencies have a single judge36 and fifteen agencies have six
judges or fewer. 37 Regardless of the number ofjudges assigned, each
agency maintains complete administrative support staffs and in
dependent physical facilities for them, including hearing rooms.
One need not be a management expert or undertake an exhaustive
study to imagine the amount of duplication that currently takes
place and the savings that might be gained from merely centralizing
the administrative support functions and from eliminating duplica
tive and under-utilized manpower and physical facilities. Funda
mental precepts of good management make this apparent.
Beyond the issue of administrative support and physical facili
ties, there is the equally important matter of matching judicial re
sources to varying agency case loads. Today, in a climate of
deregulation, a number of agencies' case loads have been drastically
reduced, while others have persistently heavy backlogs. To cite an
example, the Department of Labor which employs eighty judges cur
rently has a two and one-half year backlog in black lung cases
alone. 38 It is known that there are judges at other agencies that
would be free to hear some of these cases. The backlogs persist,
however, because there is not an effective mechanism for matching
resources to case loads on a government-wide basis. Instances of
voluntary and temporary loan arrangements in the past have not
proven to be satisfactory as there is a reluctance among agencies to
participate in loans of judges lest they concede that their case loads
are insufficient to justify the maintenance of their entire individual
staffS. 39
Maintaining separate staffs of judges at each and every agency,
disregarding the degree of their utilization and the need for their
services on a government-wide basis, is senseless in these times of
35. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, TOTAL NUMBER OF AUs ON BOARD
BY GRADE AND AGENCY AS OF NOVEMBER 21. 1983.

36. Id. They include: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Department of Commerce, Drug Enforcement Ad
ministration and Food and Drug Administration. Id.
37. Id.
38. Conversation with the Honorable Nahum Litt, Chief Administrative Law
Judge, United States Department of Labor. January, 1984.
39. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) established a "mini-corps" of
three judges several years ago to service the occasional needs of agencies. The mini
corps. however. was abandoned because of OPM budgetary limitations.
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severe budgetary constraints. That significant benefits can be
achieved from the centralized management of judicial resources is
not merely a hope of the proponents. There is empirical evidence to
support such expectations. Eight states40 have already adopted the
central management model with great succesS.41 Both New Jersey42
and Minnesota43 have led the way in perfecting the central panel
system. The savings and economies they have achieved are matters
of record. 44
The achievable efficiencies from the central management model
not only result in improved and more prompt service to the public
but are also translated into significant monetary savings. These are
examined next.
B. Cost Savings

No specific or detailed study has been made to determine the
cost savings that would be achieved under a unified corps at the fed
eral level. Nevertheless, potential cost savings may be fairly esti
mated on the basis of given assumptions. Such estimates indicate
substantial economies. Given the current caseload and the expected
efficiencies of the unified corps system, the number of administrative
law judges now employed may be reduced. The annual cost per year
to maintain an administrative law judge is approximately $125,000
for both salary and support. Thus, if it is assumed that one year's
attrition of judges is five percent or fifty-five judges, and that these
judges were not replaced, an annual cost savings of almost
$7,000,000 could be realized. Based on state experiences, this esti
mate is somewhat conservative. 4S
Another potential cost saving would result from the consolida
tion of administrative staffs of the twenty-nine agencies. While hard
to quantify, if it is assumed that there is a reduction of only one
employee earning $20,000 per year from each agency, an additional
40. California (1945). Colorado (1976). Florida (1974). Massachusetts (1974). Min
nesota (1976). New Jersey (1979). Tennessee (1974). Washington (1982). See M. RICH &:
W. BRUCAR. THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUOOES: A SUR
VEY OF SEVEN STATES 28 (1983).
41. See Levinson. The Central Panel System a Framework that Separates ALJsfrom
Adminislrative Agencies. 65 JUDICATURE 236 (1981).
42. See H. KESTIN. THE NEW JERSEY PERSPECTIVE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDI
CATIONS (1983).
43. See Harves. Making Administrative Proceedings More EJlicient and Effective:
How Ihe ALJ Cenlral Panel System Works in Minnesola. 65 JUDICATURE 257 (1981).
44. H. KESTIN. supra note 42. at 3-4; Harves. supra note 43. at 263.
45. H. KESTIN. supra note 42. at 3.
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saving of $580,000 per year in direct salary alone would be saved. In
addition, indirect expenses from fringe benefits, for example, would
also be saved. Again, this represents a very conservative estimate.
Additional savings would be realized from the consolidation
and elimination of certain physical facilities such as office space and
equipment, selected regional offices, and unneeded duplicative hear
ing rooms. Precise quantification of this item is difficult. Assuming,
however, that approximately seventy million dollars is currently ex
pended for the support of approximately 1100 judges, exclusive of
judges' salary, it is not unreasonable to expect that a reduction of five
percent, or a savings of $3,575,000, might be achieved on facilities
alone. 46
Thus, on the basis of these estimates, savings exceeding ten mil
lion dollars per year at the outset would appear to be realistic.
C. Judicio/Independence
The establishment of a unified corps would do much to insure
judicial independence, both real and perceived, of administrative
law judges. The APA undoubtedly brought about a significant im
provement in insulating judges from agency influence. Indeed,
many judges have long enjoyed complete decisional independence.47
In more recent times, however, there have been some disturbing inci
dents in which agencies have encroached upon judicial indepen
dence. The most flagrant and recent example of agency interference
occurred at the Social Security Admjnistration and resulted in a law
suit by the Association of Social Security Administration Judges
against that agency. 48 The case is currently pending in the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia before Judge Joyce Hens
Green, where it has been alleged that the agency sought to influence
judges' decisions. 49 In addition, the agency brought actions against
administrative law judges for failing to produce a fixed number of
46.

-

137,500,000 (present total costs for 1100 Judges
125,000 x 11(0)
66,000,000 (total salary based on $60,000 average
1100 x $60,(00)
71,500,000 (facilities and support costs)
.05

$3,575,000 (potential savings).
47. Blitz, 438 U.S. at 511-14.
48. Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, No. 83-124 (D.D.C. filed Jan.
19, 1983).
49. Id.
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cases per month. so
A well publicized incident in which an agency intruded upon a
judge's decisional independence involved a reprimand against a
judge by the Department of the Interior in 1977. S ) The judge was
reprimanded for issuing a decision prescribing penalties in a case
pending before him, contrary to the wishes of the agency.S2 The cost
to the judge to rectify this impropriety was substantial, notwithstand
ing that the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference
defrayed $5,000 of his legal fees.
Another incident that came to public attention involved a Fed
eral Trade Commission judge hearing the Kellogg Co. caseS3 who
sought to retire during the pendency of the case. S4 The Commission
entered into an arrangement with the judge to continue to pay him
an annual salary after retirement despite the fact that other sitting
judges were available to hear the case. Kellogg's attorneys brought
this arrangement to the attention of Congress, inferring that one of
the motivating issues was the retention of a judge sympathetic to the
Commission. ss After legislative oversight hearings, the Commission
vacated the administrative law judge's initial decision which had dis
missed the complaint and refused to proceed further in the matter. S6
It is submitted that, if administrative law judges were no longer as
signed to individual agencies, such incidents would be avoided.
In addition to the need for protecting judicial independence,
there is the matter of the public's perception of a judge as an in
dependent decisionmaker that is no less important. After all, if the
public perceives that judges assigned to particular agencies have an
agency bias, the fact that such judges actually enjoy decisional inde
pendence does not instill confidence in the fairness of the process. It
is well known that many who come into contact with the administra
tive process have serious doubts about its objectivity, particularly
when they perceive tbe judge as an agency employee who sits on the
bench with an agency seal above him. S7 It is believed that the asSO. See, e.g., SSA. v. Goodman, No. HQ7S2182100IS (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984); SSA v.
Brennan, No. HQ75218210010 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984).
51. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. I (1977).

52.

Id.

53. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).
54. Administrative La", Judge Program oftlte F. T. C: Hearing Before tlte Subcomm.
on Investigation o/tlte Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
94 (1980) (Statement of Ernest Barnes, C.A.L.J. (FTC».
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Segal, .rupra note I, at 1426.
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signment of administrative law judges to an independent entity, sep
arate and apart from the agency, would greatly enhance the public's
perception of the impartiality of the administrative hearing process.
D. Assisting the Federal Courts
Another potential benefit to be realized from the establishment
of a unified corps that has not been readily recognized would be its
availability to render assistance to the overburdened federal judici
ary. Over the years, there have been isolated instances where admin
istrative law judges have been appointed to serve as special masters
for the federal courts. S8 However, the assignment of administrative
law judges to individual agencies has prevented them from being
considered as an independent trial judge resource within the federal
government that would be available to provide temporary relief to
the federal courts when needed. In addition to the extremely heavy
case loads currently facing the federal courts, there are, for example,
additional categories of cases, such as false claims/statements cases
under $100,000, the prosecution of which has been deferred due to
the heavy demands it would impose upon the Justice Department
and the federal courts. Last year, Senator Roth proposed civil pen
alty legislation to deal with this problem suggesting that hearing of
ficers, such as administrative law judges, might be used to hear these
cases. S9 Objections were raised asserting that hearing officers as
signed to agencies with which the defendants were doing business
would not be impartial. 60 Administrative law judges assigned to a
unified corps would not carry this impediment. There are undoubt
edly other areas in which a unified corps might be utilized to relieve
the federal courts.
The opponents of a unified corps have belittled this potential
benefit as an "absurdity" since they note that Senate bill 1275 con
tains no specific provisions creating the mechanics for transferring
cases from the federal district COUrts. 61 This assertion displays a dis
tinct lack of vision. It is submitted that once a unified corps is cre
58. See, e.g., NLRB v. TUPCO, Nos. 75-185, -1371, slip op. (5th Cir. Apr. 29,
1982) (Order of Reference to Special Master); NLRB v. Turbodyne Corp., No. 78-1009.
slip op. (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 1981) (Report of Special Master); Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB,
Nos. 75-4027,76-1743, - 3835, slip op. (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1980) (Report and Recommen
dations of Special Master).
59. See S. 1566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
60. See Letter from Public Contracts Section, American Bar Association, to Sena
tor Roth 15 (Apr. 20, 1982).
61. Administrative Law JuJge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice ami Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
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ated and is perceived as an independent trial bench, there would be
ample opportunity to undertake necessary technical arrangements to
permit federal district courts to call upon the corps for assistance.
E. Additional Benefits

The present system under the APA provides a means of disci
plining or removing judges for good cause;62 however, it does not
offer a mechanism for making judges cognizant of minor deficiencies
in judicial performance that may be readily corrected. Senate bill
1275 provides for the creation of a "Complaint Resolution Board,"
composed of three judges, which would be empowered to informally
consider complaints made against judges and to recommend reme
dial action.63 It is envisioned that this Board could be used as an
indirect method for correcting deficiencies, thus bringing about a sig
nificant improvement in judicial performance.
Another benefit to be derived from a unified corps is the oppor
tunity for the uniform training of judges. It has long been recog
nized that an effective way to achieve improvement in judicial
performance is through training and continuing education. 64 Under
the current system, certain agencies permit their judges to avail
themselves of training opportunities at the National Judicial College
and at other institutions; however, many agencies do not. A unified
corps would facilitate the establishment of a uniform training pro
gram for all federal administrative law judges.6'
Additionally, Senate bill 1275 provides for a much needed pre
scription of management authority. Though agencies have desig
nated chief judges,66 the APA does not explicitly provide for such a
position. The only authority now vested in chief judges is that which
may be delegated to them by their respective agencies. As a result,
there is a wide divergence of management authority exercised by
chief judges. Moreover, some chief judges are reticent to assert man
agement authority in the absence of a specific APA provision. This
Congo 1st Sess. 183 (1983) (statement of Joseph B. Kennedy, Chairman, Ad Hoc Comm.
of Administrative Law Judges) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1275).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982).
63. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 569), reprinted in 129 CONGo REC. S6612 (daily ed. May 12, 1983).
64. Segal. supra note I, at 1428.
65. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 565).
66. At least five agencies have designated their sole judge as "chief judge."
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would be remedied by the corps bill. 67
IV.

THE OPPOSITION

The transition from the concept of a unified corps toward its
realization has sparked some opposition. As will be shown, the ob
jections raised, for the most part, either mischaracterize the proposal
or are lacking in merit.
A. Specialized Expertise

One of the principal objections is that a unified corps would
render all judges "generalists" and thus would eliminate specialized
agencyexpertise. 68 This assertion, rio matter how often repeated, is
simply without merit. Senate bill 1275 provides for a multi-divi
sional structure for the very purpose of preserving expertise among
the judges.69 Neither the fact that one division may bring together
the common specialties of several agencies, nor the fact that judges
assigned to a particular division may be called upon to hear cases
temporarily from another division, support the allegation that all the
Corps' judges will become generalists, or warrant the charge that
there will be a general dilution of expertise. Sound management dic
tates that judges possessing an expertise in a given field would con
tinue to serve therein as warranted by caseload requirements. For
example, it would make no sense to assign National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) judges, who have a specialized expertise in the field
of labor relations, to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission hydro
electric licensing proceedings. Obviously, if there were a substantial
reduction in the number of NLRB proceedings, those judges would
have to hear other types of cases and to develop an expertise in a
new field of law. It is submitted that administrative law judges have
the capacity to readily adapt to changing requirements and by doing
so, they would bring new insights to agency proceedings.

B. Physical Facilities and Personnel
It has been asserted that the creation of a unified corps would

require a new agency that "could easily exceed 5000" and that 200
67. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 565(d».
68. Hemings on S. 127.5, supra note 61, at 162-63 (statement of Althea T. L. Sim
mons, Director, Wash. Bureau, NAACP).
69. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 564(b».
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judges and support staff in the Washington area would be merged
"under the same roof," and generally that substantial new physical
facilities to house a new bureaucracy would be required. 70 Someone
not familiar with the proposal can easily imagine the need for a new
Pentagon to house the Corps. This of course is not the case. Rather
than an increase in physical facilities, there would be a significant
reduction. Of the 1100 member corps, only approximately 230
judges would sit in the Washington area7• and existing hearing facil
ities and office space would be utilized.72 To the extent that consoli
dations would permit the elimination of duplicative facilities, a
reduction in physical space would result.
Outside of the Washington area, judges are currently dispersed
among approximately 175 regional facilities,73 and thus there are a
number of opportunities for consolidation and concomitant space
reduction. For example, in New York City and Atlanta, at least four
agencies employing administrative law judges currently maintain
separate facilities. 74 Under the present system, each of the twenty
nine agencies maintain full support staffs whether they have one
judge or eighty judges.75 Contrary to the unsupported assertion that
the Corps will require "an additional 4000 support personnel,"76 any
reasonable assessment of the proposal strongly indicates that a sig
nificant reduction of support personnel may be achieved. Moreover,
as already noted,77 given the current case load, a more efficient sys
tem for matching cases with available judicial resources would un
doubtedly lead to a reduction in the total number of judges.
C. Agency Policy Implementation
A concern has been expressed that a unified corps would im
pede implementation of agency policies. 78 This concern is not well
70. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 61, at 180-81 (statement ofadministrative law
judges in opposition to S. 1275).
71. The author learned this from various discussions with OPM employees and
from various records maintained by that agency's Office of Administrative Law Judges.
72. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 4 (1983).
73. See supra note 71.
74. Id. In New York those agencies include the Coast Guard, NLRB, OSHRC
and HHS, while in Atlanta they include the Coast Guard, the Labor Department, NLRB
and HHS. Id.
75. Id.
76. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 61, at 180-81 (statement ofadministrative law
judges in opposition to S. 1275).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 35-44.
78. Heanirgs on S. 1275, supra note 61, at 295-96 (statement of C.M. Butler III,
Chairman, FERC).
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founded. At present every judge has an obligation to act consistently
with agency policy in the adjudication of agency cases. When a
judge fails to do so under the present system, the agency is free to
reverse his or her decision. Under a unified corps, the trial judge
would continue to have the same obligation with regard to agency
policy and the agency would continue to have its ultimate authority.
Moreover, in cases in which an agency has not set forth a particular
policy and the judge is obliged to chart a new course in arriving at a
decision, the record of the case, as well as applicable agency rules
and precedent, provide an ample basis for arriving at a meaningful
decision, whether the judge is assigned to a particular agency or to a
unified corps. It must be understood that judges may not, under any
circumstances, engage in extra-record communications with their re
spective agencies on matters of policy implementation or on any
other matter related to a pending proceeding. 79

D. Responsiveness
The creation of a unified corps, it is contended, would prevent
the timely processing of hearing requests on the theory that agencies
are now better able to control their dockets and judges and to estab
lish an order of priority for the hearing of cases. 80 Under the present
system, an agency generally orders a case to be heard and refers the
case to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for the implementa
tion of its order. Cases are then assigned to individual judges by the
chief judge in accordance with the APA prescribed system of rota
..tion. sl Once a case is assigned to a judge for hearing, it is the judge
and not the agency that charts the course of the hearing within the
parameters of the agency's order. Thus, whether a judge is assigned
to an agency, or to a unified corps, once the case is assigned, it is the
judge that is in charge of the case until he or she issues an initial or
recommended decision. 32
.
To the extent that an agency may request or require a chief
judge to hear a particular case or class of cases expeditiously or to
give them priority, the agency would have the same opportunity to
make such a request or demand of the Corps. There is no reason to
assume that the Corps would be less responsive than an agency chief
judge under the current system. As a practical matter, if the agency
79.
80.
81.
82.
U.S.C. §

S U.S.C. § SS4(d) (1982).
Hearings Oil S. 1275, supra note 61, at 294-9S (statement of C.M. Butler
See S U.S.C. § 310S (1982).
Appeals from the judges' interlocutory rulings may be taken to the agency. S
SS7 (1982).
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has a light case load then the prompt processing of cases does not
present a problem. On the other hand, if an agency has a very heavy
case load, and a fixed number of judges, its ability to expedite cases
is extremely limited since expediting one case causes another to be
delayed. Under the current system, an agency chief judge can only
rely upon a fixed number ofjudges. Whereas, under a unified corps,
there would be available a broader range of resources from which to
meet an agency's particular requirements. Thus, it may be seen that
a unified corps offers the potential for far greater responsiveness than
under the present system as a result of more efficient management
and greater resources.
E. Agency Referral of Cases to the Unified Corps
It has been suggested that, if a unified corps were established,

agencies might refrain from referring cases to it. 83 There is no basis
for this speculation. It is inconceivable that agencies would eschew
the trial services of a unified corps created by Congress for the pur
pose of providing such services. Moreover, there is a certain volume
of cases which must by statute be accorded on-the-record APA hear
ings. 84 As for other categories of discretionary cases, there is no rea
son to believe that individual agency heads or commissioners would
want to undertake the additional burden, time, and expense of con
ducting hearings in often protracted litigation and to deprive them
selves of the benefits of highly professional triers of fact because they
oppose creation of a unified corps. Interestingly, experience of the
state central panels has been to the contrary. For example, the New
Jersey central panel, once established and recognized as an entity
that can provide efficient trial services, has attracted the full range of
cases that had been heard by individual state agencies and has seen
its case load double in three years. 8S Moreover, former Chief Judge
Kestin reports that his office has had requests for trial services from
state entities that had not previously contemplated utilizing the cen
tral panel. 86

F. Politicization ofthe Hearing Process
It is contended that the diffusion of judges among twenty-nine
83. Hearings on S. J]7.5, supra note 61, at 293 (statement of C.M. Butler III).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982) (on the record hearings required by substantive statutes).
See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 234-38 (1973).
85. H. KEsTIN, supra note 42, at 2.
86. Discussion with Judge Howard H. Kestin, Director, State of New Jersey Office
of Administrative Law.
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agencies under the present system tends to isolate them from at
tempts at large scale politically oriented management, control or in
tluence. 87 The assertion has been made that the creation of a corps
will lead to a politicization of the hearing process. 88 This assertion is
totally unsupported. There is no reasonable basis to assume that
judges operating under the management structure proposed in Sen
ate bill 1275 would be especially vulnerable to politicization. On the
contrary, it is well known that judicial structures are the least likely
to be affected by political intluences.
In any event, since agencies are headed by political appointees
under the present system, it is difficult to see how a unified corps of
administrative law judges selected under a merit system and subject
to substantially enhanced safeguards with respect to independence
and impartiality could bring about a greater danger of political intlu
ence than that which already exists.

v.

CONCLUSION

In an era when almost every citizen is affected by the adminis
trative process, the public has a right to demand that the system for
conducting administrative proceedings be the most efficient and im
partial attainable. It has been amply demonstrated that the present
system is neither. Unlike many problems that trouble our society for
which there are no simple solutions, the condition affecting the ad
ministrative hearing process described herein can be remedied by the
establishment of a unified corps. Moreover, the proposed reform
does not impose additional costs upon an already strained federal
budget; rather, it offers significant cost savings.
A great deal has been heard regarding the need for regulatory
reform in the federal government. Senate bill 1275 offers an ideal
opportunity to effectuate a much needed reform that promises count
less benefits to the public. How long must we wait for a unified
corps to become a reality?

87. Hetuings on S. 1275, supra note 61, at 167 (statement of Althea T. L.
Simmons).
88. Id.

